THE EVOLUTION OF INTELLIGENCE
Adapted and Updated from an article written by
Dr Dennis R. Darlak
Documents on intelligence have existed for thousands of years. All civilizations of the ancient world practiced human intelligence (HUMINT) collection in one form or another, and many left behind extensive writings on the theory and practice of HUMINT. This was particularly true of the ancient Chinese and Indians, for whom HUMINT in its various forms was integral to statecraft. The civilizations of the ancient Near East and classical period in the Mediterranean also engaged in HUMINT and left behind a record of it.
The Battle of Marathon
The Battle of Marathon in 490 B.C. provides an excellent example of how knowledge of the organization and fighting qualities of a foe can influence the outcome of battle. A force from the Greek city-state of Athens, led by Miltiades, faced a Persian force that outnumbered his own forces by two to one. Miltiades had previously served in the Persian army, and this gave him keen insight about Persia’s light armor and its reliance on undisciplined mass formations. He surmised that if the Athenian forces did not immediately engage the Persians, then the Persians would break out of the coastal plain and overrun Athens and the surrounding area. Miltiades felt his force of well-armored Athenians had an advantage with its long spears and tight formations. Miltiades believed that he could defeat the Persians on the coast; and by using coast watchers and runners to inform him when the Persians had landed, he engaged the Persians and defeated them at Marathon.
Miltiades used a good intelligence data base, accurate and timely HUMINT reporting, and effective incorporation of dynamic intelligence data when formalizing his attack plans to defeat the Persians. The victory at Marathon subsequently allowed the Greek culture to flourish and leave its mark on all Western civilization.
Medina
In 624 A.D., the prophet Mohammed fled from Mecca to Medina. The governmental authorities at Mecca gathered some 10,000 men to attack and destroy him. Clandestine HUMINT collectors were left behind to gather information about such movements and report them to him. Mohammed ordered defenses to be built at Medina, which surprised those who were pursuing him, since they expected an easy overrun of a minimally defendable position. Heavy rains fell as the attackers pondered their course of action, and the rains disrupted the camp to such a degree that the army dwindled and finally departed without making any assault. As a result, Islam lived and flourished and has become a strong force in world affairs.
Mohammed had a lot of intelligence on his enemies, while they lacked comparable information on his forces and plans. The army from Mecca had old information on the fortifications at Medina, and acted on the old information without attempting reconnaissance or verification. The outdated intelligence information proved decisive in the final outcome.
The Ottoman Containment
In the 16th century, the rulers of the Ottoman Empire learned that there had been a major fire at the gunpowder factories in Venice, with vast explosions that destroyed the Venetian fleet. They decided to attack Venice while it was in a weakened military position, and to deliver an ultimatum to the Venetians. On receiving the ultimatum from the Ottoman Empire, the Venetians, who in fact had lost only four vessels to a fire, enlisted the support of other European powers. In 1571, a naval battle followed at Lepanto, and the Ottoman fleet suffered a decisive defeat. This event marked the end of the uninterrupted western expansion of the Ottoman Empire.
The Turkish campaign originated with inaccurate information that better communication could have precluded. The Turks acted on unsubstantiated information, and it led to their ultimate defeat. “Bad intelligence is worse than no intelligence.”
Intelligence Efforts Throughout US History
The French and Indian Wars
In 1759, the French Commander in Canada, Montcalm, planned his defenses against the English along the line of Lake Champlain and Fort Niagara. Montcalm learned from an intercepted letter of the British Commander, Wolfe, that the campaign against Quebec was to be by sea and the St. Lawrence River, instead of the western route as expected. With this warning, the French assembled their defenses at Quebec, which were then considered almost impregnable. Wolfe, knowing that he had lost the element of strategic surprise, resorted to tactical intelligence. He had in his army a man who was held prisoner by the French in Quebec, where he learned of a steep trail up the high embankment from the river to the plain behind the fort. The French considered the trail too steep and narrow to be used by significant military forces and left it undefended. Wolfe moved his forces up the trail, took the French by surprise, and won the battle that followed on the Plains of Abraham behind the fortified city.
This was a “spy vs. spy” story. Each side used information about the other to their advantage, until one came up with the equivalent of match point.
From the American Revolution to World War II
The origins of the US foreign intelligence undertakings lie in the Continental Congress, who, in its role as the executive as well as the legislative branch of government, established our first foreign intelligence directorate—The Committee of Secret Correspondence–in November of 1775.
The Continental Congress protected the intelligence sources and methods by authorizing the Committee of Secret Correspondence to delete the names of those employed by the committee or with whom it had corresponded. When France secretly agreed to provide arms, ammunition, and funds for the revolutionary movement, two of the committee’s members, Benjamin Franklin and Robert Morris, kept it quiet, even from Congress, because they found, by fatal experience, that many members of Congress had trouble keeping a secret.
The Presidency, beginning with George Washington, was charged, by virtue of his constitutional mandate of providing for defense and conducting foreign policy, with the management of intelligence. The constitution does not, of course, mention national or strategic intelligence, but it does imply its need.
Jefferson convinced the Congress to appropriate a sum of money to extend the external commerce of the United States. The legislation was public, but the intent of its cryptic language was to hide the real purpose for funding the Lewis and Clark Expedition, which, despite what the schoolbooks told us, was a clandestine intelligence collection mission. Its purpose was to enter the territories of foreign states, with whom we were at peace, to locate and map fortifications.
In 1806, the United States sent Lt. Zebulon Pike on the same type of mission, this time to chart the fortifications of the land drained by the Arkansas and Red Rivers. In the course of his explorations, he discovered Pike’s Peak. The Spaniards also proceeded to capture him. He convinced the Spanish forces that he had gone off course (of course), and they released him some months later. His records were so accurate that they proved to be the most reliable intelligence documents concerning the Mexican territory when the Mexican War broke out decades later.
The Civil War is awash with stories of intelligence operations, the first aerial reconnaissance (and thus technical intelligence) by balloonists, Pinkerton’s role in counter-intelligence, Lincoln’s fascination with communications intelligence, and his concern with internal administrative leaks. His concern was so great that he reportedly wrote the Emancipation Proclamation in what was the equivalent of a SCIF in the War Department Telegraph Office.
The Navy established the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) in 1882, and the Army created the US Army Bureau of Military Intelligence in 1885. Also in 1885, President Grover Cleveland authorized the posting of military and naval attaches at our foreign legations. US entry into World War I was in part precipitated by the intercept of the infamous Zimmermann Telegram, which reported a plot by the Germans to cede lands to Mexico which the US acquired after the Mexican War of 1848. The plot envisioned Mexico’s alignment with Germany and the inevitable defeat of the U.S.
Between the wars, several proposals to streamline Intelligence surfaced, including one to form a Department of Intelligence, reporting to the President. Another recommended forming a clearing house for intelligence reports. This didn’t hold up either. Instead, each command and department did its own intelligence work, and often did not share findings with other Intelligence organizations.
In 1929, a blow to US cryptologic efforts occurred. Herbert Yardley, who operated the State Department’s Black Chamber, sent then Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson a series of recently decrypted diplomatic messages. Shock overcame Stimson. He felt the Black Chamber was a violation of the mutual trust upon which he conducted both his personal affairs and his foreign policy. “Gentlemen do not read each other’s mail” was his credo, and he ordered the closing of the department’s cryptologic endeavors. Fortunately, the Army and Navy continued their code-making and code-breaking operations. Stimson himself had a change of heart by 1940; and when he was Secretary of War, he found no objection to the vital intelligence gained through the the interception for foreign transmissions.
When World War II broke out, President Franklin D. Roosevelt called Col. William J. Donovan, who had earned the Congressional Medal of Honor during World War I, to develop an intelligence service. Roosevelt told Donovan that he would have to begin with nothing, because the US did not have any intelligence service. Donovan developed the Office of Strategic Services, the OSS, which was the US Government’s closest approach to a central intelligence system during the war. It functioned in both the Operations and Research sides of intelligence. In operations, the OSS engaged in non-intelligence espionage, sabotage, counterintelligence, psychological warfare, and special operations “behind enemy lines.” In research and analysis, the OSS provided strategic intelligence production and presentation.
Developing the National Security Act of 1947
When the War ended, President Harry S. Truman decided that we had to collect intelligence in a manner that would make the information available when and where needed. The government needed intelligence professionals, not amateurs. Truman formed the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), which was the direct predecessor to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). It reported to the National Intelligence Authority (NIA), which was a body consisting of the Secretaries of War, State, and Navy. The CIG and the NIA, however, had only a brief existence. They became victims of institutional resistance and turf battles.
President Truman quickly realized the need for a more effective way to coordinate intelligence programs within the government. Donovan came up with a plan for a truly central intelligence system under Presidential supervision, i.e., a cabinet-level department. The Navy proposed a central intelligence agency to coordinate foreign intelligence activities and to synthesize departmental intelligence on the strategic and national policy level. What ensued was the basis for the National Security Act of 1947, which remains the statutory basis of the US Intelligence Community. The legislators who drafted the Act took five major prerequisites into account:
(1) Intelligence would come under civilian control — the President would have overall responsibility for the country’s national intelligence efforts. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and his deputy would have no supervision, control, restriction, or prohibition over any department of government. The DCI would head the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), but the CIA would not come under a department of government. It would be autonomous. If the DCI or Deputy DCI were a military officer, that person would have no supervision, control, powers, or military functions inside the military establishment or the Department of Defense.
(2) The Intelligence Community would speak with one voice. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) would coordinate all intelligence research and analysis.
(3) The intelligence needs of the government would be consolidatd, with the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in the leadership role.
(4) The intelligence community budget would be consolidated.
(5) Oversight of the Intelligence Community would come from internal and external authorities.
The Intelligence Community During the Cold War:
Some Successes, but Many Hard Lessons
The National Security Act of l947 was purposely vague in defining CIA’s responsibilities. The military services and State Department had opposed centralized management of intelligence, arguing that preparation for wartime operations demanded control over peacetime intelligence activities. The result was essentially a compromise: CIA became a “coordinator” in a confederation of departmental intelligence organizations. To advise the DCI in discharging his duties, President Truman in l948 instituted the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC)–a predecessor of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) established in l958. The IAC included representation from each of the military services, the Department of State, CIA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Atomic Energy Commission. It did not include representation from the Department of Defense. Moreover, poor coordination, insufficient involvement, and unclear authority hampered its effectiveness.
Also in l948, President Truman appointed a commission under former President Herbert Hoover to assess the organizational effectiveness of the Executive Branch of Government. The Commission formed a special task force to examine closely the national security apparatus, especially the workings of the Intelligence Community under the National Security Act. To its dismay, the task force found wasteful duplication, personnel problems, unsatisfactory coordination, and conflicting intelligence estimates, especially among the military services. The task force also noted that intelligence estimates were frequently subjective and biased, often interpreting the capabilities of potential enemies as intentions. The findings of the Commission led to the l949 amendments to the
National Security Act and to the Central Intelligence Act of l949.
The “Cold War” between the US and Soviet Union saw much competition in the development of weapons–first the atomic bomb (replicated by the Soviets in l949) and then in ICBM and space programs in the l950’s. Remote-sensing techniques and extensive engineering analysis became increasingly important when assessing activities in closed or denied areas. In l949, the Defense Department formed the jointly manned Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) to administer strategic communications, cryptology, code development and code breaking. AFSA was the forerunner of what became the National Security Agency (NSA), which President Truman created by Presidential directive on 4 November 1952. With similar duties as the AFSA, NSA served as a model for a jointly manned, centralized intelligence activity under the Department of Defense.
In August 1961, Secretary of Defense McNamara created the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to consolidate and to coordinate the production of intelligence analysis by each of the military services. DIA opened its “new” production center in 1963, but the military departments maintained their own analytical capabilities. In 1965, DIA was given responsibility for administering the newly-created Defense Attaché system, consisting of uniformed military personnel serving in embassies and collecting, by overt means, information useful to the military.
Also in 1961, Defense Secretary McNamara established the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to exploit substantial advances in US technical intelligence collection capabilities. Within a year of its founding, NRO was playing an important role in Intelligence collection. In 1962, the US launched its first photo reconnaissance satellite, and photographs by U-2 aircraft were a large factor in the successful resolution of the Cuban missile crisis. A year later, the SR-71 made its first high altitude, high speed reconnaissance flight. NRO’s existence, however, remained highly classified until September 1992.
In addition to the NSA, DIA, and NRO, each of the military services maintained substantial intelligence organizations, both at the departmental level and at the tactical level. These organizations typically collected information and provided analysis regarding the weapons systems, tactics, and capabilities of foreign counterpart forces. This information and analysis supported the weapons acquisition process, force development and contingency planning in each of the services.
The decade of the 1970s began with serious efforts to institute DCI control over the Intelligence Community, but they were eventually undermined by a series of sensational disclosures in the media. This led to unprecedented investigations of the Intelligence Community within the Executive Branch and by the Congress. While the intelligence functions of the Government continued, Congress began to take a much more active role in overseeing activities and determining costs. In 1972 and 1973, the country became preoccupied with the Watergate affair; and this, in turn, created a public feeling of distrust involving many members of the Intelligence Community. Press articles covered allegations of collection efforts undertaken against US citizens during the Vietnam era, attempts to assassinate foreign leaders or destabilize communist regimes, and even criticized efforts to raise the remains of a Soviet submarine off the floor of the Pacific. In December 1974, in reaction to reports of CIA’s support to the non-Communist resistance forces in Angola, Congress passed the “Hughes-Ryan amendment” to the Foreign Assistance Act, which for the first time required the President to report any covert operations in a foreign country. (Section Six contains a more detailed discussion of Intelligence oversight responsibilities.)
On 18 February 1975, President Gerald Ford issued an Executive Order on Intelligence which, for the first time, provided a clear description of the Intelligence Community and its responsibilities. This public presidential document also set up a Committee on Foreign Intelligence as part of the National Security Council. President Ford also instituted a number of restrictions on intelligence agencies, including a ban on assassinations as an instrument of US policy. To monitor compliance with the Order, he established a new Intelligence Oversight Board within the Executive Office of the President.
On 24 January 1978, President Carter issued a new Executive Order on intelligence which reaffirmed the DCI’s Community-wide authority over priorities, tasking and the budget. President Carter added additional restrictions on collection techniques, participation in domestic activities, and human experimentation; and reiterated the ban on assassinations.
When Ronald Reagan became president, he reemphasized a vast majority of rules and guidelines adopted during the Ford and Carter Administrations. On 4 December 1981, almost a year into his Administration, President Reagan issued his Executive Order on Intelligence (E.O. 12333), which remains in effect today. It generally reaffirmed the functions of Intelligence agencies (as outlined in the previous orders) and continued most of the previous restrictions, but it set a more positive tone than its predecessor. EO 12333 also gave the CIA greater latitude to gather foreign intelligence within the United States and to provide assistance to law enforcement. The Executive Order also provided a new NSC structure for reviewing intelligence activities, including covert actions.
The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, which reorganized the Department of Defense and shifted authority from the military departments to the Joint Chiefs and theater commands, also had an impact on Intelligence. The Defense Intelligence Agency and Defense Mapping Agency were specifically designated as combat support agencies. The Act also required that the President submit annually to Congress a report on US national security strategy, including an assessment of the adequacy of Intelligence to support the strategy.
Adjusting to a New World Order
In the three years following the presidential election of the first George Bush, the world witnessed some profound changes that had an enormous impact on the Intelligence Community. In the fall of 1989, the Berlin Wall came down and Germany began the process of reunification. The communist regimes of Eastern Europe gave way to democratic rule. In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait; and in January 1991, the US and its allies launched Operation Desert Storm to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Then the Soviet Union broke apart with former Soviet Republics declaring independence. As communist rule ended in Russia, some very senior government and military leaders questioned the role of Intelligence in “the new world order.” The Intelligence Community began streamlining and reorienting toward new missions, with a greater focus on transnational threats.
Operation Desert Storm of 1991, brief though it was, had profound repercussions for US Intelligence. The war highlighted a need for the United States to coordinate and link Intelligence with combat systems and to train military personnel to use these systems effectively. The concept of the “joint intelligence center” or “JIC,” with representation from key Intelligence agencies, resulted from lessons learned during the Gulf War. The National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) at the Pentagon became the first permanent JIC formed after the conflict and now all unified and specified commands have a JIC.
Many of the challenges facing the Intelligence Community in dealing with the “new world order,” however, were not new. While petty problems caused by institutional bias had largely disappeared, improvements in cooperation and coordination among the members of the Intelligence Community remained constant goals. Technology helped, with innovations like the computer, Intelink (the internet for the Intelligence Community), and secure teleconferencing systems; but the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 also identified some additional challenges for Intelligence in the 21st century. Two areas received special attention: the revamping and strengthening of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and the threat caused by asymmetric warfare in a multi-polar world.
Intelligence After the Tragic Events of 11 September 2001
Amazingly, looking for a scapegoat to blame for the tragic events of 11 September 2001 did not materialize on a grand scale. Most of the country’s leaders and members of the press corps recognized that, even if the Intelligence Community had compiled all the clues and indicators that terrorist attacks were imminent, the country’s response would probably have not prevented the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks. The Intelligence Community lacked sufficient “actionable intelligence” for the President to respond. Also, the precedent of terrorists hijacking passenger aircraft for the suicide mission of destroying a building had never occurred before. Even if the Intelligence Community had advised the President of the hijacking potential, details on specific airports, airlines, and flights were not available. Although only speculation, most likely the President would have resisted shutting down the airline industry prior to the attacks.
For sure, the Intelligence Community could have done a better job with the information that was available prior to the events of 11 September 2001. Lack of coordination between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) allowed some information to “slip through the cracks.” Commissions appointed to investigate the events of 2001 also found that many Intelligence analysts lacked imagination, creativity, and vision; and many were still tied to Cold War paradigms.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004
On 17 December 2004, President George W. Bush signed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act. This bill represented the broadest reorganization of the country’s Intelligence Community since the National Security Act of 1947. Under the bill, the then fifteen (now sixteen) separate Intelligence agencies became more closely controlled and monitored under a single command structure, headed by a Director of National Intelligence (DNI). Among the major changes was the central control of the Intelligence budget for all sixteen agencies by the DNI. In the past, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) theoretically had budget leverage; but in reality, the various Intelligence agencies had considerable freedom on how they spent the money allocated to them. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 also placed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under the DNI umbrella. Previously, the CIA had autonomy, reporting to the President directly rather than through an executive cabinet-level department of government. Now the CIA reports to the DNI, who has become the principal Intelligence Advisor to the President and the rest of the National Security Council.
The bill also created a national counterterrorism center and bolstered border and aviation security. In those areas, the bill authorized the hiring of an additional 10,000 border police between 2005 and 2010. To check on excesses in the fight against terrorism, the bill established a “Privacy and Civil Liberties Board,” although the Board’s charter is still quite vague.
The stimulus for the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act was a report by a national commission that investigated the 11 September 2001 attacks by al-Qaeda on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Ironically, President Bush had initially opposed the creation of the “9/11 Commission,” and later he resisted some of its recommendations. However, public pressure and the tight presidential election campaign in late 2004 forced a change in President Bush’s earlier position.
The long-range effects of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act remain uncertain. The measure has considerable “fuzzy language” that leaves much room for interpretation. By itself, it might simply result in changes to the Intelligence Community’s organization chart. So far, the President has given the DNI considerable authority in running IC affairs. Each of the five appointees who has filled the DNI position since the passing of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act have had an impressive résumé, and this has aided in establishing high credibility with the Executive and Congressional branches of Government. Additionally, either the director or the principal deputy director has had a military background, a requisite Congress wanted before passing the Act.